美人计1946

看希区柯克 7⃣️ 《美人计》

二战后希胖的第二部作品，在我看来，与前作《爱德华》相比，这部要逊色很多，更像是一部披着间谍，悬疑外皮的爱情电影。

是什么可以让“褒曼”冒着生命危险，去成为一名肩负国家利益重任的间谍呢，是对“格兰特”深切的爱！而其情绪波动变化，源自于“格兰特”有没有在下派任务时说出关心自己的话语，显得很矫情，不像是一个间谍。影片后半，也是影片氛围营造相对较好的，藏钥匙那段很妙！想必是惊天魔盗团的手法来源吧！打碎的酒瓶和撒落的铀，也解释了前面埋下的一个小伏笔。结尾很有意思，塞巴斯蒂安渴望被拯救无果后，在德国佬的呼唤下，恐慌的回到房子里，大门关上隐入黑暗。迎接他的大概率是死亡，也展现出了战时敌人冷血，虚假的丑恶嘴脸。

影片里有一段褒曼和格兰特的吻戏，间断的亲了好几次，一边亲一边说台词，颇具喜感！原来是《海斯法典》规定吻戏不能超过三秒，所以他俩不得吻三秒后停下再吻，哈哈哈哈！

用镜头表达情绪，赋予电影优雅的魅力。

以前看电影的时候，常常光顾着看剧情，看美人，镜头的存在感不是很高。这部片子让我特别注意到了镜头的存在。

作为一部悬疑片，电影中紧张的情绪如何传递给观众？这部电影，不是靠演员表演出着急忙慌的样子，用演员的情绪感染观众。而是通过镜头的剪辑，将环境的紧张气氛表现出来。

用镜头代替语言，去除了一堆可能破坏电影美感的东西，保留了电影的完整性与简练美，赋予其一种优雅的魅力。

优雅得甚至让人觉得有些情节不真实，比如说，里面有一个镜头是褒曼把偷来的钥匙扔到地上，再用脚踢到角落里，以她当时的姿势是不可能实现的，但那灵巧的一踢又把电影中紧张的情绪瞬间化解了。

拿里面的几个镜头举几个例子，看看导演是如何用镜头表现情绪的。

褒曼发现她的咖啡被下了慢性毒药后，镜头在下药的两个凶手之间切换，画面逐渐变得模糊，两凶手的样子幻化成两个扭曲的黑影，镜头开始晃动，画面也开始变形。褒曼意识到真相后的震惊与害怕，以及她慢性中毒后身体的虚弱，就这样在镜头中展现出来了。

有一幕是在楼梯上，艾利克斯想要阻止格兰特带褒曼去医院。但当时家里正在开会，他担心他的妻子是美国特工的事情被败露，被他的同伙们秘密处决掉。楼下是一起开会谋划“大事”的人。镜头突然转到其中一人的脸上，一张陌生严肃的脸突然占据了整个荧幕，让我产生一种不适感，这种不适感也让我体味到纳粹头子当时的紧张与进退两难。

这种感觉跟我们犯了错，怕被父母知道很相似。原本父母都是熟悉的样子，在事情要败露的时候，爸妈的一举一动似乎都有了不一样的意味。电影里那张陌生的脸，放在人群里的时候，不会特别去注意，当犯了错要受到惩罚时，则变得格外瞩目。

电影为了表现男女主相爱时的缠绵热烈，有一段时长近三分钟的长镜头，格兰特和褒曼一边亲吻着，一边谈论着晚餐，这期间他们始终拥抱着。这段长镜头传达了导演关于爱的理念——爱是不能被打扰的，即便是去接电话，或者是挪一个步子，也不愿与对方分开。

还有一幕经常被提及，就是褒曼在偷钥匙时，导演用了一个7秒的运动镜头，模仿褒曼的主观视角，镜头在钥匙和纳粹头子的身影之间移动，然后以一个快速加长的上推镜头把观众的目光拉到褒曼的目标上去——即偷到那把钥匙。镜头的快速移动增加了情节的紧张性，让我们也随着镜头速度的变化情绪起伏。

最后的结尾是艾利克斯慢慢地转过身向自己家走去，门渐渐关上。这里用了一段30秒的上摇镜头，景别由小变大，方向由正变向背，也给我们留下了无尽的悬念：艾利克斯是否会被同伙审判并处决？褒曼与格兰特是否能够成功逃脱联邦调查局和纳粹残党的追捕？

问题还没有解决，一切留待观众去想象。

镜头是电影里的语言。

大概只有对生活有了细致入微的观察感悟，并抓住骨干对其进行合理的夸张放大，才能用镜头将那些看不见摸不着的情绪，准确传神地表达出来。

这让我对希区柯克更加佩服一分，跟风膜拜一下，嘻嘻。

Yet let us recall the final scene of Notorious (1946): Devlin elopes with the poisoned Alicia from Sebastian's house in full view of the latter's Nazi collaborators. What we have here is a homologous underlying structure of the three gazes, of the three subjective positions: the ignorant Other is here the members of the Nazi ring who do not know that Alicia is an American spy and that Sebastian knows it (the reason why he is slowly poisoning her with his mother's help); the actants are Devlin and Alicia-Devlin escorts her down the staircase, posing as her friend who will take her to the hospital, with Sebastian's agreement; the helpless opponents are Sebastian and his mother, reduced to the role of passive observers-although Devlin's act is directed against them, any public countermove of theirs would instantly reveal to the members of the Nazi gang present that Alicia is an American spy and that Sebastian knows it, whereby Sebastian would sign his death warrant. What makes this scene different from the three above-mentioned comic interludes is the character of the third agency, the ignorant big Other, the public which witnesses the duel of the actant and his opponent: the Other loses here its benevolent innocence and assumes features of a threatening paranoiac agency. Those who range Notorious among the few Hitchcock's films which display noir sensibility are therefore in the right: one of the features which characterize the noir universe is precisely this mutation in the status of the big Other.

引自

Enjoy Your Symptom!

评价人数不足

Slavoj Zizek / 2007 / Routledge

The very notion of the big Other (of the symbolic order) is founded on the special kind of double deception that becomes visible in a scene from the Marx brothers' Duck Soup, where Groucho defends his client before the court of law with the following argument in favor of his insanity: "This man looks like an idiot and acts like an idiot—but this should in no way deceive you: he IS an idiot!" The paradox of this proposition exemplifies perfectly the classical topos of the Lacanian theory concerning the difference between animal and human deception: man alone is capable of deceiving by means of truth itself. An animal can feign to be or to intend something other than what it really is or intends, but only man can lie by telling a truth that he expects to be taken for a lie. Only man can deceive by feigning to deceive. This is, of course, the logic of Freud's joke about two Polish Jews often cited by Lacan. One of these men asks the other in an offended tone: "Why are you telling me that you are going to Cracow,, so that I'll think you're going to Lemberg, when you are really going to Cracow?" This same logic structures the plot of a whole series of Hitchcock's films: the amorous couple is at first united by a pure accident or an external constraint, i.e., they find themselves in a situation in which they must pretend to be married or in love, until, finally, they fall in love for real. The paradox of such a situation could be adequately described by a paraphrase of Groucho's plea: "This couple looks like a couple in love and acts like a couple in love—but this should in no way deceive you: they ARE a couple in love!" We find perhaps the most refined version of this in Notorious, when Alicia and Devlin, American agents in the house of Sebastian, a rich Nazi supporter and Alicia's husband, furtively enter the wine cellar to explore the secret contents of the champagne bottles. There, they are surprised by the sudden arrival of Sebastian. To conceal the real purpose of their visit to the cellar, they embrace quickly, feigning a clandestine meeting of two lovers. The point is, of course, that they are effectively in love: they succeed in deceiving the husband (for the time being, at least), but what they offer him as a lure is truth itself. This kind of movement "from outside inward" is one of the key components of the intersubjective relations in Hitchcock's films: we effectively become something by pretending that we already are that. To grasp the dialectic of this movement, we have to take into account the crucial fact that this "outside" is never simply a "mask" we wear in public but is rather the symbolic order itself. By "pretending to be something," by "acting as if we were something," we assume a certain place in the intersubjective symbolic network, and it is this external place that defines our true position. If we remain convinced, deep within ourselves, that "we are not really that," if we preserve an intimate distance toward ''the social role we play," we doubly deceive ourselves. The final deception is that social appearance is deceitful, for in the social-symbolic reality things ultimately are precisely what they pretend to be. (More precisely, this holds only for those of Hitchcock's films designated by Lesley Brill as "romances," in opposition to the "ironic" films. The "romances" are ruled by the Pascalian logic whereby social play gradually changes into an authentic intersubjective relationship whereas the "ironic" films [Psycho, for example] depict a total blockade of communication, a psychotic split where the "mask" is effectively nothing but a mask, i.e., where the subject maintains the kind of distance from the symbolic order characteristic of psychoses.)

引自

Looking Awry

8.8

Slavoj Žižek / 1991 / The MIT Press

What matters in Notorious is not the fact that there are some bottles of wine filled with sand ('ore'), but that the wine is in the cellar; that the cellar door is locked; that the key is in the husband's possession; that the husband is in love with his wife; that she herself is in love with another; and that the third party wishes to know what is in the cellar.

第二部分第五章

Everything You Always Wanted to Kno

评价人数不足

Zizek, Slavoj (EDT) / 1992 / Verso